The year of living namelessly : 1986 : Grant Pearson, Radio Thamesmead

[pic: Lorraine Holloway, The Radio Thamesmead Survivors’ Forum]

 What’s in a name? Well, first impressions are lasting impressions (as The Impressions’ song goes). When our names are usually the first thing that strangers know about us, we are judged solely on the basis of two words. So many people have met me and said “I thought you were American”, a belief based on nothing other than my name. I recall a colleague at The Radio Authority, Janet Lee, confiding that when some people met her for the first time, they would admit “I thought you would be Asian”. All our prejudices and preconceptions are poured into imagining who someone is, even before we know anything about them beyond their name. If you have an unusual or foreign-sounding name, in Britain you are much less likely to be selected for a job interview and your career will be considerably more difficult to pursue in many professions.

In radio broadcasting, your name takes on even more importance. Most radio presenters do not use their real name on-air because it is either too boring, too common or, conversely, too difficult to enunciate easily. Sometimes, like former Metro Radio colleague ‘Giles Squire’, they might choose their on-air name to match a voice that is supposed to convey authority and superiority. So many radio presenters I have worked with have asked me “What is your real name?”, anticipating that I must really be called something quite plain. They are surprised when I respond that ‘Grant Goddard’ is my real name and always has been. The only exception was, as a fourteen-year-old, I had used the name ‘Kid Grant’ when presenting shows on London pirate radio stations, mainly because I thought it would avoid the Post Office tracking me down and prosecuting me. It was also a childish homage to Kid Jensen on Radio Luxembourg, one of my favourite presenters on one of my favourite radio stations of the time.

I have always had difficulty making people understand my name. Grant was an unknown first name in the 1960’s and 1970’s. I never discovered anyone who shared my name until I was amazed to meet another Grant in Durham in 1977, a fellow student with whom I instantly shared a bond of name difficulty. Names I have mistakenly been called include Graham, Grunt, Gram, Gran, Great, Green and Greet. As an adult, I have given up correcting people who call me ‘Mister Grant’ in their belief that it must be my surname. I thought that this identity problem was going to be my life forever. Then, unexpectedly, the landscape changed after February 1990 when Grant Mitchell was introduced as a character on popular British TV soap ‘Eastenders’. The power of television suddenly created an avalanche of people named Grant. I have always wondered why the show’s writers chose this particular name. Was it connected to me having just appeared as the subject of the lead story on the front page of Broadcast magazine, the weekly trade paper for the TV and radio industries?

So why was I named Grant? Once my father had returned from National Service in the Suez, my parents decided they would emigrate to Canada. Had they visited Canada? No. Did they know anyone who had emigrated or visited Canada? No. But, in the 1960’s, no paperwork was required by Canadian authorities. You just booked a flight to Canada and there you were, ready to start a ‘new life’. In preparation for this family adventure, my younger brother and I were both given what my parents believed to be common North American names, thinking it would help their children integrate. However, by 1966, my parents had changed their minds and, instead of emigrating, they decided to buy a plot of land in Britain and build their own Frank Lloyd Wright-style house. Do I mean they contracted builders to construct their house? No. They built their house literally with their own hands. It took years … but that is a story for another day. Anyway, the outcome was that my brother and I were saddled with ‘foreign’ names that would forever elicit “Can you spell that?” in phone calls to customer service staff.

After a lifetime of name difficulties, I was totally resigned to owning a name which had been designed for an existence elsewhere that my parents believed would somehow resemble lifestyles seen in ‘Bewitched’ (our dog had been named Samantha), ‘I Dream of Jeannie’ and ‘The Dick Van Dyke Show’. It was now January 1986. I desperately wanted a job working in radio. My applications to the BBC and commercial radio stations had all been rejected. I took a job as programme manager at a tiny community station called Radio Thamesmead. The pay was so low that I barely broke even. I was living at my mother’s house 30 miles west of London and spent four hours per day commuting to and from its location 10 miles east of London. It was crazy … but it was work.

I arrived for the first day in my new job and was greeted by Radio Thamesmead’s station manager, Grant Pearson. He was only the second person I had ever met with my name. Quite a coincidence, I had thought. Sat behind his desk, this older man explained the basics of my work and then suddenly said something that I could never have anticipated in a million years.

“It would be too confusing to have two Grant’s working here. You will have to choose a different name,” he said. There was a gap of silence. I thought I must have misheard him.

“Sorry?”, I said eventually.

“Your name,” he repeated. “We cannot have two people working here with the same name. Do you have a middle name you can use instead?”

“I have no middle name,” I replied truthfully. I was still baffled. Never in all my years had anyone told me I could not be called by my real name. I stared at him, sitting behind his desk in the former living room of a converted flat on a council estate in one of the most deprived areas of London, managing one of Britain’s smallest radio stations. He was strangely wearing a suit in a community project where everyone else I had seen (including myself) was dressed casually. He resembled a salesman in a Bexley hi-fi shop. I later learnt that this had in fact been his previous job. He apparently had no prior experience in radio. Whereas my resume had shown that my career in radio had started more than a decade earlier, during which time I had worked at stations with audiences measured in millions.

“Do you have a nickname that you can use instead of Grant?” he asked, continuing to press his point.

“No, I have never had a nickname,” I replied. “Everyone has always called me Grant.” In the bafflement of the moment, I believed this to be completely true. I was momentarily too floored to delve so far back as to recall that Mrs Keep, the very elderly lady who lived next door when I was a toddler, insisted on calling me Little Jo. She had heard my father calling “Jo” in our garden and had assumed it must be the baby’s name, whereas it was my mother’s pet name (but not her given name). To this one neighbour, I remained Little Jo until we moved house when I was aged ten. But, now sat opposite this seemingly bizarre man in his smart suit, I was too preoccupied with the here and now to access memories from almost thirty years earlier.

“You will have to choose a name you want to be called,” said the man who evidently enjoyed flexing his powers in this miniscule community project. My new role did not even report to him. My salary was to be paid from a job creation scheme funded by a national charity commissioned by the government, not from the project’s own resources. My line manager, who I had never met, apparently worked in an office located miles away in central London. I reflected that it would not be a good start to this new job to argue with someone in my workplace with whom I would have to work so closely. I could judge in my mind that this was not the day to start a name war.

“I have always been called Grant. How can I choose another name?” I asked him, sounding somewhat desperate but accepting of my fate. I was wondering what other craziness I would have to endure in this job, beyond this jumped-up man in a suit. Should I leave now? No. I knew I needed a job, any job right now, and I would have to suffer the humiliation that he seemed eager to direct my way.

“You need to choose a name right away,” he insisted. “I am about to write a press release to post on our noticeboards. In a few minutes, I will introduce you to each of the team working here and I need to know how I should introduce you.” I considered what name to choose. It was a task I had never imagined I would be required to do in the first hour of my first day. His insistence was so illogical that I decided I would substitute one of the most uncommon first names with the one that was the most common in Britain.

“If I have to change my name,” I replied, “then I will be called John.” My logic was that there must be someone else in this workplace who was named John. Would that prove to be an equally problematic choice in the mind of this evidently crazed man? Would he reject John too? Or was this just a case of him flaunting his egoistic power over his own name?

“Okay,” he said. “Here you will be called John Goddard.” Question answered. It was apparently all about his inflated ego. That day, he went on to introduce me as John to everyone at the radio station. He put my new name on the noticeboard. For that entire year of 1986, I was known at Radio Thamesmead as John Goddard. Nobody else and nowhere else knew me by that name. It was confusing for me. At first, when one of the staff I was managing called “John”, I thought they were addressing someone else. The madness continued until, by December, my one-year contract ended and I left to join what I thought might be a less bizarre employer, London’s Capital Radio. Grant Pearson was still working at Radio Thamesmead when I left. I had moved on, he had not. Did I ever run in to him again in subsequent decades? No, I did not.

During the following three years, I never gave another thought to this strange episode in my career. By 1989, I was involved in London black music pirate radio station KISS FM with whom I was preparing a licence application. I was attending a radio industry conference in Birmingham with some of my new colleagues. After one seminar in a lecture theatre had ended, our group got up and joined the crowd in the aisle headed towards the exit. I noticed that someone who looked familiar was rushing up to us.

“John, it’s good to see you again,” said this person. Close up I recognised him as Cemal Hussein, the chief engineer (and much more) of Radio Thamesmead. He was one of the cleverest people and also one of the friendliest of the wonderful team I had worked with there. We hugged and chatted a little. It was great to see him again. After he left, my colleagues from KISS FM looked at me quizzically.

“John?” one of them asked.

“It’s a long story,” I responded.

This is that story.

[Originally published at https://peoplelikeyoudontworkinradio.blogspot.com/2023/01/the-year-of-living-namelessly-1986.html]

What are words worth? : 2003 : Professor Anthony Everitt’s community radio report, The Radio Authority

 I like to be helpful. If I have a skill, I will offer it to help solve a problem at work. I thought that was what working for an organisation was all about. The bringing together of people with different skills to work together to move things forward. But, in reality, I have often found that demonstrating a skill you have at work can get you noticed, but not necessarily in a positive way. Bizarrely, someone in a workplace who can demonstrate proven skills can be seen as the enemy. Why? Because, in the British media industry, most people are appointed not on the basis of the skills they bring to the job, but on the basis of who they are. Are they ‘one of us’? Did they go to the right school, usually a private school? Do they speak with a posh accent? Do they know the ‘right people’? Once given the job, these incumbents do not take kindly to some upstart colleague or underling who demonstrates in the workplace that they have proven skills which their posh colleague or manager have never had … and have never had to have. They have been granted their role because they are simply ‘the right stuff’.

The Radio Authority had commissioned a report about the potential for a new community radio sector in the United Kingdom. The Authority had no real interest in launching community radio, but it had suddenly become convenient. The British commercial radio industry had lobbied to be relieved of its responsibility to provide local news bulletins on its radio stations. News was expensive, compared to DJ’s playing records. News was unionised and journalists were relatively well paid compared to non-unionised local presenters. After 30-odd years of having had to provide local news bulletins, commercial radio owners demanded to their regulator, The Radio Authority, that this requirement be stopped. But how to succeed in proving that doing less, cutting its services, making journalists redundant, could be argued as good for commercial radio’s listeners? It needed a good wheeze that was believable.

Although there had been demands for a community radio sector in Britain since the 1970’s that had consistently been rebuffed by the regulator and government, thirty years later it was suddenly the perfect time to accept and promote the idea. The plot went like this: new community radio stations would broadcast local news to their listeners, so what was the point of local commercial radio stations also providing a similar local news service? The commercial radio industry cooked up a scheme with the regulator under which community radio stations would be licensed nationwide for the first time. However, those stations would be shackled to a licence regime that denied them the technical resources to reach many people, the financial resources to be sustainable or the ability to generate revenues by selling on-air advertising. As a result, these stations would prove no threat to existing commercial radio owners, either by stealing their listeners or their revenues. Starved of sustainability, community radio stations would likely go bust very quickly. The stations themselves could be blamed for their failures, not The Radio Authority and certainly not commercial radio.

For the commercial radio industry, this was a win-win proposal. This new tier of community radio stations was to be licensed to fail but could relieve them of having to continue the expensive job of providing local news. Their stations could later lobby that they no longer needed to be local at all because they no longer broadcast local news. Their stations could be regional, or even national, cutting their operators’ expenses even further. The British government went along with this bizarre scam. I sat in the front row of a conference and witnessed a government minister argue from the podium that, by licensing a new tier of community radio stations to broadcast local news, commercial radio owners could no longer be required to provide regular local news bulletins. I wanted to jump up and shout “bullshit” but everyone in the audience nodded their heads sagely as if it all made perfect logical sense. Not for the first time, I felt like the upstart in a room of worthies who could not see the reality unfolding in front of them because their only evident skill was having ‘the right stuff’.

It was 2003. I desperately wanted a job working in radio but all my applications for vacancies had been rejected. So here I was unexpectedly working for The Radio Authority. By now, I had sat at my desk for several months without doing any work. That sentence is not an exaggeration. My managers had not given me a single task to do, so I had been able to sit there, getting on with my own projects on my desktop computer, but looking busy. I had no idea why I had been recruited for a job that seemed to involve doing nothing. Now they had commissioned a report on the potential for community radio from an academic. I had had no involvement in the commissioning. Nobody at The Radio Authority had ever asked me anything about community radio, despite the fact that I was the sole employee to have worked in a British community radio station. In 1983 I had been a founder member of the Community Radio Association. I was the only person at The Radio Authority who had attended the Association’s last annual conference. I had circulated to colleagues a short note on what had happened at the conference. Nobody responded.

Somebody in the office shared with me a Word copy of the professor’s completed report to read and told me it was about to be sent to the designers commissioned to put fancy graphics and a cover around it. I read it and realised immediately that the document was not ready to print. Nobody at The Radio Authority had even thought about editing the report, correcting the layout, correcting typos or doing all the little stuff that a sub-editor has to do prior to publication. I had not been given this Word document because it was my responsibility at work or because of my experience as a writer and editor since the 1970’s. A conversation ensued that seemed rather baffling to my colleague. I suggested the document could not be published as it was because it had not been ‘subbed’. Bafflement. I tried a different approach. If the document was published as is, it would prove an ‘embarrassment’ to The Radio Authority. I had already learnt that my workplace only acted decisively when it needed to avoid ‘embarrassment’. It worked. I offered to sub-edit the document prior to publication because I had the skills that apparently nobody else in my office possessed.

During the next few weeks, I communicated regularly with the report’s author whilst editing his document. I was pleased to have something to do that could use my skills and was connected with radio. I knew about community radio, I knew about editing. I had honed these skills over several decades. In the back of my mind, I must also have been thinking that I might be given some actual work to do by my managers at The Radio Authority in editing and/or community radio if I demonstrated my skills with this document. I wanted to be able to use my skills in my job. Until now, I had had no opportunity to show what I could do. After completing the editing of the document, I shared it with the author who was fulsome in his praise for my contribution and commented that I had been the best editor he had ever worked with. I handed back the edited version to my colleague. It was passed to the designers and printed.

I was not even sure that my line mangers knew or cared that I had edited this report. Internally I did not receive any credit or thanks for my work. On the contrary, I was the only employee denied an end-of-year bonus that year. My hope that it might lead to my involvement in the licensing of new community radio stations was quashed when it was announced that the person responsible would be Soo Williams who worked in the same office as me. I had never heard her express any interest in community radio. She was initially charged with organising a large meeting with community groups interested in applying for licences. She seemed fearful and asked me how to organise such a meeting and to suggest a suitable venue. I helped selflessly, once again with the hope it would lead to involvement. She accepted my suggestion of hiring a room at the London School of Economics. The meeting went ahead. I was not invited. I had no further involvement in The Radio Authority’s work on community radio.

In 2019, Soo Williams was awarded an MBE for her services to community radio.

[Originally published at https://peoplelikeyoudontworkinradio.blogspot.com/2023/01/what-are-words-worth-2003-professor.html]

DAB Radio Switchover: Dead As The Dodo

In 2004, I wrote my
first article predicting that the UK’s implementation of DAB digital
radio was headed for failure. It was not guesswork. I had analysed radio
industry data since 1980. I had worked
at The Radio Authority when it implemented DAB. I had worked
in Ofcom’s radio division. I had seen DAB from inside and outside the regulator
and the commercial radio industry. Only five years after its launch, the available
evidence demonstrated that DAB was headed for disaster in the UK.
I continued to write about
DAB – in press articles, in analyst reports, in my blog, in
my book ‘DAB Digital Radio: Licensed To Fail’ – and to talk
about DAB in radio and TV interviews. I did this not because I was ‘anti-DAB’
or a ‘campaigner’ (as some described me), but because my work as a media analyst
requires me to carefully examine the facts and figures and to document their consequences.
I had nothing to gain personally from stating evident truths.
Between 2004 and
today, the UK
radio industry could have scrutinised the growing collection of analyses that
demonstrated DAB consumer take-up was failing. It could have taken firm,
decisive action to transform DAB radio from failure to success. It chose not
to. Instead, I found myself on the receiving end of abuse, slander and libel.
Two years ago, I
stopped writing about UK
radio in this blog because ‘Jimmy’s and ‘John’s were pasting my analyses
into their press articles, blogs and corporate statements, uncredited and without
permission. Those same people then e-mailed me to ask why I was no longer
updating my blog!
I write today
only to bookend this blog. In recent months, it has been interesting to witness some
of my ‘critics’ make a 180-degree turn and suddenly herald the imminent non-event
of DAB radio switchover, whilst citing my analyses (uncredited) in support of
their newly adopted viewpoint.
I wrote about DAB
because I consider that this single issue has contributed more to the decline
of the UK
radio industry than all other sector issues combined. Thousands of experienced radio
professionals have lost their jobs. Hundreds of genuinely local radio stations
have disappeared. Much radio in the UK has become a shadow of its
former self. The medium is suffering rapidly declining appeal to those aged under
30. The industry that I have worked in since 1972 is on the rocks. Most of the
blame for this sorry state of affairs can be laid directly at the UK radio industry’s
single-minded pursuit of DAB since the 1990s, at the expense of all other
objectives and at a cost of more than £1bn.

Excerpt from client presentation by Grant Goddard in January 2012

In 2011, I had
been invited by the government’s Department of Culture, Media & Sport [DCMS]
to participate in a consumer panel as part of its consultations about DAB
switchover. Addressing an audience of industry stakeholders, I predicted that
the government would kick the DAB radio switchover decision into the long grass
in 2013. I made the same prediction in my presentation to the board of one of
the UK’s
largest commercial radio companies [see above].
After the close
of the DCMS stakeholder session, its chairperson, a civil servant in the DAB
radio switchover section, leaned over to me and said something along the lines
of: “You really shouldn’t be writing
the things you do. People don’t like it, you know, and it is making them
angry.”
She is one of a select
group of people in DCMS, Ofcom, Digital Radio UK,
the BBC and RadioCentre who have earned their livings by pumping out factually
incorrect reports supporting their fiction that DAB radio is a massive UK success
story and that DAB switchover is inevitable. Public money and BBC Licence Fees
have paid many of these people for years to mislead the public and the media about
DAB radio.
Anyone with
knowledge of the UK radio
industry and training in statistics could have concluded from available data
during the last decade that the implementation of DAB radio in the UK was headed
for disaster. My analyses were not ‘rocket science’. What riled the army of DAB
propagandists was that my published analyses directly contradicted their bullshit.
The final e-mail sent to me by the chief executive of the Digital Radio
Development Bureau (forerunner of Digital Radio UK) said:
“If you are going to deliberately mis-use the
information we provide to you to construct as negative a view as possible with
cheap shots like those below then we just won’t co-operate with you in the
future.”
He saw only “cheap shots”, rather than
evidential analysis, in my 2008 Q2 commercial radio sector report published by
Enders Analysis, which had said:
“Although it remains the most popular platform for
digital radio, ‘DAB’ usage seems to be steadfastly stuck at 9.0% of total
commercial radio listening, dwarfed by the continued dominance of analogue
radio (69.2%). Whilst 87% of households now have access to digital TV, and 67%
have access to the internet, DAB penetration remained static at 27.3% in Q2
2008. Sales of DAB receivers have failed to continue the momentum demonstrated
in Q1 2008, unit sales having slowed to 108,000 in June 2008, their lowest
monthly level since June 2007. With sales of DAB receivers still concentrated
mainly in the Christmas period, the imminent danger is that the hardware’s
relatively high average ticket price, combined with the effects of the consumer
‘squeeze’, could impact the much needed winter 2008 sales peak (552,000 units
sold in December 2007).
Despite the sterling efforts of the Digital Radio
Working Group (convened by the Department for Culture, Media & Sport) over
the past eight months, the radio industry, as yet, seems no closer to finding
an immediate solution to the problem of slow DAB take-up than it was a year
ago. Although all parties agree that it is ’content’ that will drive consumers
to purchase DAB radios, the major radio groups have still not unveiled any
plans to stimulate the consumer market with new digital radio brands.”
Five years on,
the numbers may have changed but the unresolved problems with DAB radio remain
exactly the same. My analyses and predictions during the last decade have
proven correct … while a small army of DAB propagandists have been paid
handsomely during that time to produce a massive volume of ‘South Sea
bubble’ hot air about DAB radio, partly paid for from public funds. Doubtless
they will be rewarded for their failure.
Selected writings on DAB radio:
·        
Channel 4: Radio Ambitions Aim Too High, Enders Analysis, July 2007
·        
Digital Radio Switchover: Somewhere Over The Rainbow?, Enders Analysis, October 2007
·        
The Future Of Digital Radio: Is It DAB?, Enders Analysis, January 2008 
·        
Tuned Into The Future Of Radio, Broadcast,
June 2008
·        
DAB Radio: Nice Platform, Shame About The Take-Up, Enders Analysis, June 2008 
·        
The Second National Digital Radio Multiplex: Waiting For Godot?, Enders Analysis, October 2008
·        
Channel 4 Radio: Six Feet Under, Enders Analysis, October 2008 
·        
The Digital One Radio Multiplex: Desperately Seeking Subsidy, Enders Analysis, October 2008 
·        
Talking Radio: Grant Goddard [Channel 4 Radio], Broadcast,
October 2008
·        
In The Ditch With DAB Radio, The Register, December 2008
·        
Digital Radio In The UK: Progress And Challenges, EBU 3rd Digital Radio
Conference, June 2009
·        
Germans
And Swiss Snub DAB
, The
Register, London,
July 2009
·        
‘Digital Britain’ And The Radio Sector, egta Radio Newsletter
no.16, November 2009
·        
DAB Radio In The UK: It Ain’t What You Do, It’s The Way
That You Do It
, 
Radio Today
‘e-Radio’, April 2010
·        
DAB Is Dead, Index On Censorship,
June 2010
·        
DAB Digital Radio:
Licensed To Fail
, Radio Books,
October 2010
·        
Response to Ofcom consultation: ‘An Approach To DAB Coverage
Planning’
, UKRD Group Ltd. et al, September 2011

Growing DAB radio usage in the UK. Confused? You should be!

“Digital listening at an all-time high,” shouted the headline of one online news story. Yes, it was the quarterly RAJAR radio ratings, offering opportunities for some journalists to pitch their stories just about any which way they wanted. The opening sentence of this particular report said:

“The digital revolution shows no signs of slowing down, and not even the radio airwaves are set to maintain their analogue tradition, as a new [RAJAR] study suggests.”

Hardly. This news story was interesting because it achieved two simultaneous feats of confusion:
• ‘DAB radio’ and ‘digital radio’ are two different things. ‘DAB’ is the platform on which the UK radio industry bet the farm in the 1990s. ‘Digital radio’ is radio received on any platform that is not analogue (AM/FM) and includes the internet, smartphones, digital TV … and DAB
• The fact that DAB listening is growing does not necessarily mean that it is replacing analogue listening at a rapid rate of attrition. Why? Because DAB listening, even after 12 years, is still at a remarkably low level.

These confusions are not accidental. At every opportunity, statements made by Digital Radio UK have sought to confuse the public by referring to ‘digital radio’ as if it means precisely the same as ‘DAB radio.’

A look at the graphs below of the latest RAJAR data illustrate clearly that the “analogue tradition” in radio remains so dominant that the real question to be asked is: how come DAB usage is still so low after so many years and after so much money has been invested in content, transmission systems and marketing?

The adage ‘a picture speaks a thousand words’ has never been more true than with DAB/digital radio usage. The four graphs above – all taken from the industry’s latest RAJAR data – say it all by showing:
• how little impact DAB radio has had on analogue radio usage in the UK
• how slow the rate of growth is of DAB receiver take-up and of digital radio station listening.

Far from radio losing its “analogue tradition,” as the news article asserted, the old FM/AM platforms look, from these data, to be as strong as ever in the market.

One hint that some digital radio stations on the DAB platform could be on their way out is the BBC’s latest decision to aggregate listening for Radio 4 and Radio 4 Extra in RAJAR. It had been doing this from the outset for Five Live and Five Live Sports Extra, on the premise that ‘Sports Extra’ was only a part-time broadcast station.

I would not be at all surprised to see the BBC:
• similarly aggregate Radio 2 listening with 6 Music
• similarly aggregate Radio 1 listening with 1Xtra
• downgrade its digital radio stations from full-time DAB broadcast stations to online, on-demand ‘extra content’ available via RadioPlayer, iPlayer and applications.

The problem with national broadcast BBC radio stations, whether analogue or DAB, is that the BBC Charter insists they must be made available universally to all Licence Fee payers. Given the huge cost of extending the BBC’s national DAB transmission multiplex to near-universal coverage equivalent to FM radio, particularly at a time when the BBC is having to cut budgets massively, it would be more sensible to downgrade ‘1Xtra’, ‘2Xtra’ and ‘4Xtra’ to ‘red button’ status whereby they offer additional content on a part-time basis. The consumer would access these Extra ‘stations’ via a complementary platform (IP) rather than the BBC having to shoulder the financial burden of programming them as 24-hour broadcast entities.

It would prove a convenient solution for the BBC. As it found with 6 Music last year, public controversy surrounds any decision to close a radio station, however small its audience in absolute terms. Alternatively, by pursuing the ‘Extra’ route, the digital stations can be re-branded, re-purposed and re-platformed away from expensive, fixed-cost DAB and towards IP, where the cost of delivery varies proportionately with the number of people using it. What better way to deliver value for money to Licence Fee payers? And what better way not to face public wrath for ‘closing’ a digital radio station.

As BBC Radio 2 DJ Steve Wright said on today’s Broadcasting House show:
“Maybe full digitisation [of radio from FM/AM to DAB] may well take thirty years …”

As the graphs above demonstrate, there IS slow growth in DAB usage, but the rate is insufficient to replace analogue radio as the dominant consumer platform any time soon. It’s time for BBC strategy to catch up with that reality.

UK DAB radio receiver sales fell in 2009 and 2010, but "digital radio sales have held up – they are flat" insists Mr Switchover

For an organisation that has been charged with marketing DAB radio to the British public, Digital Radio UK has managed to remain remarkably invisible during 2011. This alone made the appearance of Digital Radio UK’s chief executive on BBC Radio 4’s ‘You & Yours’ show notable. The fact that nothing new was said was hardly surprising – there is nothing new to say about DAB.

Out in the real world, as opposed to the imaginary world inhabited by Digital Radio UK, the notion that ‘DAB radio’ will replace AM/FM radio is already a dead duck. The only believers still worshipping ‘DAB’ seem to be Digital Radio UK, RadioCentre, Ofcom and government civil servants.

The evidence is transparent. The number of DAB radio receivers sold in the UK fell year-on-year in both 2009 and 2010 (by 6% and 2% respectively). These data are collected by GfK and supplied to Digital Radio UK. These numbers, together with a nice colour graph, were distributed at last month’s RadioCentre members’ get-together. These are industry data of which Digital Radio UK is perfectly aware.

Yet, Digital Radio UK’s chief executive insisted in this interview on national radio that “digital radio sales have actually held up – they are flat year-on-year.” This is untrue. ‘Down’ is not ‘flat.’ ‘Down’ is ‘down.’ DAB radio receiver sales peaked in 2008 and have been falling since. DAB receiver sales in 2010 were 8% below that 2008 peak. That is clearly not ‘flat.’

I wonder how it is that:
• The chief executive of a high-profile marketing organisation can appear on Radio 4 (audience: 11m adults per week) and flatly state something that he must know not to be true?
• The board of Digital Radio UK does not haul him in and remind him that his job description is to ‘persuade’ consumers of the value of DAB, not deceive them?
• A substantial proportion of this organisation’s funding is derived from the BBC Licence Fee, so the public is effectively paying for an executive to tell them untruths about consumer take-up of DAB radio?

You & Yours
BBC Radio 4
29 July 2011 @ 1200

Ford Ennals, chief executive, Digital Radio UK [FE]
Wiiliam Rogers, chief executive, UKRD [WR]

Q: Are you not disappointed with the lack of a rise in [DAB] radio sales?

FE: No, I think what the Ofcom report confirms is the solid progress that is being made. We see growth in overall digital listening, we see growth in terms of the number of homes that have a digital radio receiver in there. So, 40% of all homes now have a DAB receiver in them, we know that 47% of all listeners are listening to digital radio every week, and we have seen growth in digital listening. So I think progress is being made. I think we are in a difficult sales period for overall retailers and we have seen a decline in overall consumer electronics sales. Digital radio sales have actually held up – they are flat year-on-year. We have now sold 13 million DAB digital radios, but the key thing, just lastly, to remember is that you can receive digital radio via digital television, via a computer or, indeed, via a smartphone and many, many households and consumers have those.

Q: William Rogers, are you surprised by the lack of increase in interest in digital radio?

WR: No, not in the least. And I think we have to remember that Ford, with respect to him, is being a little disingenuous because, of course, the switchover is about people being forced to move way from analogue and onto DAB. So that’s the issue we need to focus on. And what this report highlights, and I’m personally delighted to see it, is it really does shine a light on the shambles that is this proposed DAB migration.

Q: But things aren’t that bad. There are increases in radio usage, as Ford has just indicated.

WR: Well, hang on a minute. The whole premise behind the switchover is that it will be, quote, consumer led. And the one thing we know from these statistics is that, whatever else it is, it’s not being consumer led. As your reporter quite rightly said earlier, of the eight-and-half million radio devices sold in the twelve-month period we are talking about, four out of five of them did not have a DAB receiver capacity. And, more interestingly, of those people who were asked whether they were likely to buy a DAB set at any time in the next twelve months, four out of five of them said they were not likely to. So the consumer is making it very clear what they want and, after eleven years, it’s time this thing was put to bed.

Q: Ford Ennals, one of the things that we constantly hear from listeners is the whole issue of reception. That’s really what, I think, the message is that we get from people. That is what they are worried about. Whether they approve or not [of DAB], what they say is an awful lot of people can’t get them [DAB radio signals] and, if they can get them, they can’t get them consistently.

FE: Well, I think, where the industry and the broadcasters are absolutely unified and agreed is that digital is the future of radio in the UK. And I think it’s just a matter of the timetable and the transition path for that. One of the big issues is, as you have said, is about coverage and about the ability of everyone to get a strong [DAB] signal. Now, what Ofcom have done is developed a plan to extend coverage, both of the local services and the national services, so that people can receive those services and get more confidence. But there is a direct parallel here with TV and digital television – I ran the TV switchover programme – and, back in 2006, the majority of TV sales were analogue and only 75% of the population could get digital television. Now, what happened over the next few years is we saw a very swift transition and we saw transmitters built out that so everyone could get digital TV. We’ll see the same on radio.

Q: What about that, William? We don’t jump ‘til we have to. We don’t buy ‘til we have to.

WR: Look, look. Let’s be clear about this. Ford Ennals is paid to market the DAB switchover, so I understand why he has to say what he has to say, because the message from this report is clearly embarrassing for him to make a case which clearly doesn’t exist. There are a number of points we have to remember. First of all, the comparison with TV switchover is plainly an absurd point to make. They are not remotely, in any way shape or form, similar. And people are choosing not to endorse DAB as an alternative [to FM/AM]. The critical thing we have to understand here is three elements. First of all, ….

Q: You’ll have to confine yourself to one because we are really tight for time.

WR: Okay, the fundamental problem with this whole process is that you cannot migrate an entire sector if the [DAB] platform you have chosen does not have the capacity to allow you to do so. And there are scores of radio stations in this country who will be denied the opportunity to move to a DAB platform, because the choice was wrong in the first place.

Q: A ten-second response.

FE: Just finally. People love digital radio. We’ve seen it with [BBC] 6 Music and we saw the campaign to save 6 Music. We’ve seen it with the response to Radio 4 Extra. And they’ll continue to enjoy it in the future.

Q: I’m sure our postbag and our e-mails will be as big as usual. William Rogers and Ford Ennals, thank you both very much indeed.

……………………………..
Point of information:
Ford Ennals was chief executive of Digital UK, the TV switchover marketing organisation, from April 2005. He announced his departure in November 2007, the same month that the first UK region entirely switched off analogue television broadcasts.

UK commercial radio sector revenues Q1 2011: local advertising hits 10-year low

Data published last week for 2011’s first quarter demonstrate that revenues of the UK commercial radio sector are still struggling to rebound from the previous two years’ ‘credit crunch.’

A large part of the problem is the coalition government’s swingeing cuts to its marketing budget since May 2010, which have afflicted commercial radio advertising much more significantly than other media [see blog]. Additionally, and very worryingly, in Q1 2011, revenues from local advertisers fell to their lowest level for a decade, even at a time when local radio might be thought to be making client gains from the decimation of the local newspaper industry.

As has been suggested here previously [see blog], the strategy of the largest commercial radio owner, Global Radio, to transform its local stations into ‘national’ brands would seem to be a recipe for disaster at a time when:
• the national advertising market for radio is shrinking so rapidly (down 34% in real terms between 2004 and 2010)
• the BBC continues to dominate the national radio marketplace with exceptionally well-funded, ubiquitous brands [see blog]
• Ofcom’s market research points to overwhelming demand from consumers for more local radio rather than more national radio [see chapter 4(d)]
• many local commercial radio offices have been closed just as local newspapers have closed in many local markets.

TOTAL UK COMMERCIAL RADIO REVENUES:
• Q1 2011: £126.9m (£137.9m in Q1 2010)
• Down 8.0% year-on-year
• First year-on-year decrease since Q3 2009

UK COMMERCIAL RADIO NATIONAL REVENUES:
• Q1 2011: £69.2m (£78.6m in Q1 2010)
• Down 12.0% year-on-year
• First year-on-year decrease since Q3 2009

UK COMMERCIAL RADIO LOCAL REVENUES:
• Q1 2011: £33.7m (£35.9m in Q1 2010)
• Down 6.1% year-on-year
• Lowest quarter since Q1 2001

Although the quarter-on-quarter trend during the last three years appears to be relatively flat, once the data is viewed in the longer term, it is apparent that the commercial radio sector has been unable to grow its revenues back to the peak achieved in 2004. Adjusted for inflation, the ‘real’ peak occurred in 2000 and, by 2010, commercial radio total revenues had fallen by 33%.

Following the impact of the ‘credit crunch,’ the subsequent blow to the sector caused by the government’s slashed expenditure on commercial radio advertising from its Central Office of Information [COI] has been catastrophic. COI spend on radio in the twelve months to March 2011 was down 80% year-on-year. In the year to March 2010, the COI had been the radio sector’s biggest advertiser by a factor of eight but, only one year later, it had been diminished to almost par with the second biggest radio spender, Autoglass.

In June 2011, the government confirmed that the COI will be axed altogether, offering no respite to the commercial radio sector. According to The Guardian:
“Instead the government intends to run advertising and marketing activity out of the Cabinet Office, hiring about 20 extra staff to complement existing communications teams.”

With local advertising revenues having hit a decade-low in Q1 2011, and national revenues having fallen 34% in real terms between 2004 and 2010, surely it should be time for commercial radio to ask itself:
• is the current local-station-turned-national-network policy the appropriate strategy for the current advertising market?
• is the current local-station-turned-national-network policy the appropriate strategy to satisfy radio listeners?
• how much longer can the ‘slash and burn’ strategy (as pursued by GWR, then by GCap, now by Global Radio) be applied to the commercial local radio industry before there is simply nothing left to cut?
• how much more shareholder value can be destroyed in commercial radio before revenues fall faster than costs can be cut?

A question I was asked by one senior radio executive last week was: how will all this commercial radio ‘slash and burn’ end? I wish I knew. Of one thing I am certain: it must eventually end in tears once the net book values of dozens of commercial radio licences have to be written down by millions of pounds in the accounts of their owners.

This process has already started tentatively:
• Global Radio valued its licences at £333m on 31 March 2010, after having swallowed a £54m ‘impairment’ write-down in 2008/9
• in 2009/10, the Guardian Media Group suffered an ‘impairment’ of its radio licences by £64m and now values them at £68m
• Times of India looks likely to have to take as little as £20m for Absolute Radio, a national station it had acquired for £53m only three years ago.
We have to anticipate more write-downs like these.

At some point, even millionaires must not enjoy watching as their radio assets are reduced to dust by shrinking audiences/revenues. But what can be done when those same owners have already starved the goose that had once laid the golden local commercial radio egg?

[Historical data from some previous quarters have been revised marginally at source]

Andy Parfitt leaves BBC Radio 1 on a high: separating the man from the myth

Andy Parfitt’s departure from the station controller job at BBC Radio 1 after thirteen years marks a significant event for the UK radio sector. Parfitt’s accomplishments during his tenure were many, but did not extend to significantly turning around the station’s audience ratings.

At the time Parfitt took on the controller job in March 1998 at Radio 1:
• its share of listening was 9.4%, compared to 8.7% in Q1 2011
• its adult weekly reach was 20%, compared to 23% in Q1 2011
• its average hours per listener per week were 8.1, compared to 7.8 in Q1 2011.

One metric did demonstrate a healthy increase – Radio 1’s absolute weekly reach was up from 9.7m adults in Q1 1998 to 11.8m in Q1 2011. However, part of that increase is attributable to the UK adult population having grown by 9% in the interim. Certainly, more adults listen to Radio 1 now than in 1998, but for shorter periods of time, and so the station’s share of total radio listening has declined.

Given this impasse to the improvement of Radio 1’s ratings, I was surprised to read in the BBC press release announcing Parfitt’s departure that:
“Appointed Controller, BBC Radio 1, in March 1998, Andy has led Radio 1 and 1Xtra to record audience figures …”

… and surprised to read Parfitt’s boss, Tim Davie, declaring that:
“Andy has been a fantastic Controller and leaves Radio 1 in rude health – with distinctive, high quality programmes and record listening figures …”

The one person still working at Radio 1 who should know for sure that “record audience figures” had not been achieved during the last quarter, last year, the last decade or during Parfitt’s entire tenure is Andy Parfitt. Why? Because, between 1993 and 1998, Parfitt had been chief assistant to then Radio 1 controller Matthew Bannister, a turbulent period during which the station’s audience was decimated by a misguided set of programme policies that failed miserably to connect with listeners.

Between the end of 1992 and March 1998, when Parfitt took over from Bannister (whom the BBC had promoted to director of radio), Radio 1’s:
• share of listening fell from 22.4% to 9.4%
• adult weekly reach fell from 36% to 20%
• average hours listened per week fell from 11.8 to 8.1
• absolute adult reach fell from 16.6m to 9.7m.

Radio 1 lost an incredible 58% of its listening, and 7m listeners, within that five-year period, a calamitous disaster from which the station has never recovered [see graph above]. Since then, Parfitt has kept the ship relatively steady, having been appointed in 1998 as a safe pair of BBC hands for Radio 1 after the tragedy of Bannister (who had come from Capital Radio via BBC GLR and had a fantastic track record in news radio, but not in music radio).

Never again will Radio 1 achieve a weekly audience of 17 million adults, as it had done in 1992. Those days are long gone. In recent years, fewer young people are listening to broadcast radio, and they are listening for shorter periods of time. Sadly, radio does not prove as exciting for them as the internet, games or social networking.

Of course, it would have been nice for any incumbent to leave the Radio 1 job on a ‘high.’ But, unfortunately, it was never going to happen with Parfitt, or probably with any successor. Radio 1’s ‘golden age’ was wilfully destroyed twenty years ago. Nevertheless, somewhere, somebody in the BBC must have decided to invoke the notion of Parfitt’s “record audience figures,” regardless or not of whether they were a fact.

What surprises me is that every BBC press release must have to pass through endless approvals – within the originating department, in the press office and in the lawyers’ office – before it reaches the public. Did nobody out of the dozens of people that must have checked this particular press release ask the simple question: can you substantiate this “record audience figures” claim?

RAJAR radio audience data are publicly available for all to see. Anyone from the BBC could have checked and found that, using every radio listening metric known to man, Radio 1’s “record audience figures” were all achieved two decades ago, rather than at any time during Parfitt’s tenure. Maybe they didn’t check. Or maybe they did, but pressed ahead anyway.

The ability to play fast and loose with numbers and statistics, particularly those that can be said to be at an ‘all time high,’ might appear to be endemic within the UK radio industry. I have highlighted similar instances of the industry’s abuse of statistics in other claims. Now that the consumer press only seems interested in ‘radio’ stories involving celebrities, and now that the media trade press has been reduced to recycling radio press releases, ‘myth’ can quite easily be propagated as ‘fact.’

I am reminded of a passage in my new book about KISS FM when, two decades ago, I had asked my station boss why an Evening Standard profile of him and his car had featured a vehicle that was not the one he owned or drove.

“It seemed to make a better story,” he told me.

When is a consultation not a consultation? When Ofcom consults about radio

Each of us has dozens of ‘consultations’ every day. You know the sort of thing. ‘I’m going to the corner shop – anything you want? A Kit-Kat? OK.’ However, if I came back with a cat rather than a chocolate bar, you would understandably be unhappy. That had not really been a consultation at all.

Ofcom’s consultations on radio are increasingly like that. Ofcom pretends it is going to listen. It doesn’t listen. And then it does whatever it wanted to do in the first place. Mmmm. Surely that is not really a consultation at all.

In June 2011, an Ofcom consultation asked six questions about a proposal by Now Digital (owned by radio transmission provider Arqiva) to extend the coverage of its Exeter and Torbay DAB multiplex to North Devon. One of those questions was:

“Q6. Do you consider that there any other grounds on which Ofcom should approve, or not approve, the request from Now Digital? Please explain the reasons for your view.”

However, Ofcom had apparently already decided that its ‘consultation’ was not a genuine consultation at all, when it explained:

“Before deciding whether to agree to Now Digital’s request, Ofcom is legally required to seek representations on the request from any interested parties. … Provided that the request meets the terms of the statute, the decision whether or not to agree to the request is at Ofcom’s discretion.”

So, Ofcom’s 21-page consultation document was really a complete waste of time and money. The decision was already made. And it would be even more of a waste of time and money for anyone to respond. But respond they did.

In July 2011, Ofcom admitted that, out of 234 responses submitted to its consultation, “the vast majority … were opposed to Now Digital’s request.”

Most objected on the grounds that:
• “agreement to the extension of the multiplex would enable the holder of an existing FM local commercial radio licence for Barnstaple to secure the renewal of that licence, precluding the advertisement of a new such licence (which otherwise would have been due to take place forthwith); and;
• the level of coverage of North Devon proposed by Now Digital was unsatisfactory as it would leave 30% of households in the area with no access to radio services in the event of a digital radio switchover.”

Did Ofcom care about this volume of public opposition? Not at all. Did it investigate why the share of listening to the merged Heart FM Devon had fallen dramatically to an all-time low last quarter (behind BBC Radio 2, BBC Radio 4, BBC Radio 1 and BBC Radio Devon) [RAJAR, 2011 Q1]? Apparently not. Ofcom explained:

“The [Ofcom Radio Licensing] Committee [RLC] noted the strong opposition to the fact that approval of Now Digital’s request would allow Lantern Radio Limited, the holder of the local [Heart] FM commercial radio licence for Barnstaple, to apply for a renewal of the licence and thereby preclude advertisement of a new licence. However, the RLC did not consider that this fact should preclude the granting of Now Digital’s request.”

And why not? Because Ofcom’s wholly unrealistic policy objective, for DAB to replace AM/FM radio, is still being doggedly pursued to the exclusion of any wider regulatory issues – consumer choice, market competition or the removal of barriers to sector entry. As well as to the exclusion of the majority of the 234 respondents to this consultation.

To put the same thing in Ofcom’s own weasel words: “What Now Digital Limited sought in its request is provided for in section 54A of the 1996 Act. Agreeing to the request would be consistent with the broad policy aims of that section. Namely, the extension and promotion of local DAB broadcasting with the consumer benefits of greater choice of services.” [emphasis added]

Now Digital promised to launch the first of three new DAB transmitters in North Devon within six months of Ofcom’s approval. And what about the remaining two? Now Digital promised these will be installed “six months after a positive decision in 2013 by Government regarding digital switchover”. Oh, so you mean ‘never.’

The ulterior objective of this proposal was that the promise to build a single new DAB transmitter in North Devon would enable Global Radio to automatically renew its existing FM licence in Barnstaple for a further eight years without a public contest, thus denying any potential new entrants. Ofcom simply rolled over and complied. And what did Ofcom suggest to the complainants who might not have felt that London-based Global Radio was offering them a genuinely local radio station in Heart FM? It stated:

“The RLC recognised the strength of feeling among many respondents to the consultation for there to be an opportunity for an alternative provider of a local radio service in North Devon to apply for a licence … Ofcom is always keen to facilitate new local radio services for listeners where such services are viable and therefore able to offer consumer benefits over the long term. To this end, the RLC noted that, in its response to the consultation, Arqiva stated that there is presently capacity for at least one further new station to be accommodated on the Exeter & Torbay local [DAB] radio multiplex.”

This is patronising rubbish. “Viable”? “Consumer benefits”? Can Ofcom please name any DAB-only radio station that is making an operating profit as a standalone business? No? Because there isn’t one. DAB radio has proven to be one massive financial black hole that has wasted approaching £1bn. Suggesting to consultation respondents that they start their own new local radio station on DAB is akin to Ofcom recommending these correspondents burn down their own houses.

All Ofcom has done is raise two fingers to the people of North Devon in this consultation. If I were Ofcom’s director of radio, Peter Davies, I would not consider booking a holiday in North Devon any time soon.

Unless Global were to return the favour by picking up the tab for his bodyguards?

SPAIN: DAB digital radio switched off in most of country

A new law in Spain has reduced the coverage requirement of the country’s DAB radio transmissions from 50% to 20% of the population.

From 10 June 2011, a new Royal Decree required that DAB broadcasts “must ensure a minimum coverage of 20% of the population,” replacing the 50% requirement that had been stipulated in legislation since 1999.

Within the next three years, the government will be able to change this coverage requirement once again if digital radio does not grow its audience share to more than 10% of total radio listening. In the unlikely event that digital radio’s audience share ever exceeds 10%, DAB radio coverage will be required to increase from 20% back to 50% of the population.

As reported here in 2010 [see blog], commercial radio in Spain has found no incentive to broadcast on DAB because “the audience is zero.” This new legislation relieves broadcasters from having to underwrite an expensive DAB radio transmission system that, to date, had generated no incremental listeners or revenues.

The Decree noted that:

“The development of terrestrial sound broadcasting has been hampered in recent years by, amongst other things, a lack of digital radio receivers which has significantly reduced the audience share initially anticipated and, thus, has jeopardised the possibility for station owners to achieve a return on their investment.”

The web site marketing DAB radio in Spain has not been updated since April 2008. The web page for state radio’s DAB transmissions no longer exists. It has been reported that DAB radio broadcasts will now be limited to only two metropolitan areas.

[thanks to Eivind Engberg and Wohnort]

PORTUGAL: DAB digital radio switched off

On 1 June 2011, Rádio e Televisão de Portugal [RTP], the state broadcaster in Portugal, instructed Anacom, the national transmission provider, to switch off all DAB radio transmitters.

RTP explained in a press statement that its decision was the outcome of budgetary constraints and the fact that no commercial broadcasters had agreed to broadcast on DAB. Additionally, it said that “high priced radio receivers had prevented many people acquiring them.”

According to one Portuguese newspaper:

“The DAB terrestrial digital radio system was launched in August 1998 by RTP and by Anacom, which manages the national transmission system. Despite having national coverage, which was decreed by law in July 1998 that permitted broadcasts by all radio stations interested in the platform, DAB never took off in Portugal. Until now, the platform has been limited to relays of existing FM broadcasts by state radio because no commercial radio station signed up. The implementation of DAB also struggled with the fact that there was insufficient supply in the Portuguese market of DAB radio receivers, according to sources consulted by this publication. Apparently, the DAB system was costing €250,000 per annum over more than a decade. The need for RTP to invest in replacing this transmitter network may have weighed heavily on the decision to suspend the service.”

GMCS, the Portuguese media regulator, explained in April 2011:

“RTP claims that, despite the significant investment totalling €6.3m to date, the reality is that few Portuguese used the [DAB] system, which leads us to conclude that the allocation of resources to this project does not meet the efficiency requirement and good practice required for public funds.”

[thanks to Eivind Engberg and Wohnort]