Tag: digital radio

Ofcom’s DAB radio strategy: busy doing nothing, trying to find lots of things not to do

In June 2010, the government published its flimsy 5-page response to the House of Lords Communications Committee’s critical 279-page report on digital switchover that had been unveiled three months earlier. The response was a disappointing document that dismissed with little more than one sentence each of the Committee’s carefully worded recommendations, deduced after having considered hours and volumes of evidence.

One of the Communications Committee’s most forceful recommendations, in Paragraph 107, had concerned the necessary improvements to DAB reception:

“Given the importance for the Government’s plans for digital switchover of universal reception of the BBC’s national stations, it is essential that a firm and unambiguous plan and funding for the completion of build-out of the BBC’s national multiplex is put in place as soon as possible.”

The government’s feeble response to this issue was:

“In order to agree a plan for DAB coverage build-out, so that it can ultimately meet the current levels of FM coverage, Ofcom have been asked to form a Coverage and Spectrum Planning Group to make recommendation on the following:
• the current coverage of national and local radio on FM;
• changes to the current multiplex structure and frequency allocation; and
• what new infrastructure is needed so that DAB can match FM.
Ofcom are expected to present their recommendation to Government in Spring 2011.”

Surely it does not need yet another government committee to look into DAB? Had not these issues already been considered by the Digital Radio Working Group two years ago? By Digital Britain a year ago? By Ofcom? By anybody during the last decade of DAB underachievement?

Then I recalled a speech made by Ofcom Director of Radio, Peter Davies, to the Radio Festival in July 2008, in which he had set out his imminent workplan on the DAB issue:

“Increased coverage of DAB will be absolutely essential if it is ever to become a full replacement for FM for most services…… That brings us to the tricky part – defining what existing coverage is and how we improve it. This is still work in progress but we are approaching it in three stages. Firstly, we need to define what existing FM coverage is. That’s not nearly as simple as it might sound. Radio is not like television where you stick an aerial on the roof and you get reception or you don’t. Radio is used in every room in the house, usually with a portable aerial. It’s used outdoors on a wide variety of devices and it’s listened to in cars. So we need to look at geographic coverage as well as population coverage, and we need to look at indoor coverage in different parts of the house. FM coverage gradually fades as you move around, so we need to decide how strong the signal needs to be to be usable. And, surprisingly, this work has never really been done in any kind of consistent manner for the UK as a whole, so it has taken a little while to agree a framework and calculate the numbers.

Having done that, we then have to do the same for existing DAB coverage. Now DAB has all the same issues as FM, but it also has different characteristics. It doesn’t fade in the same way – you either get it or you don’t – so we need a different set of definitions here. Once we have defined what existing DAB coverage is, we then have to work out what it would take to get existing DAB coverage up to the level of existing FM coverage. Now, we have already done a lot of work on this, and certainly enough to inform the interim report, and the whole thing will be finalised in time for the [government’s] Digital Radio Working Group final report later this year.”

This 2008 workplan seems to comprise precisely the same tasks that the government has just told Ofcom to start and complete by Spring 2011. So what happened? Was this work not done by late 2008, as Davies had promised? And if not, why not?

Improvements to DAB reception were considered a critical issue for consumer take-up of DAB radio … in 2008. Now, in 2010, they are probably the main factor likely to sound the death knell of DAB as a mass market consumer platform. So are we to assume that, in the intervening two years, work on this essential issue was never done, or was not completed, by Ofcom?

Why should consumers consider DAB radio to be anything other than a disaster if even our public servants appear to be busy doing little to fix the acute problems with DAB reception that the public has been rightly complaining about for years?

Digital radio switchover: talk is cheap, action will never happen

Politics is the art of flip-flop policymaking (and justifying it convincingly). This is evident in the new UK government’s first statement about DAB radio and digital radio switchover, published this week. What is its new policy? Well, there is no new policy. The Conservatives are simply continuing the previous Labour government’s ill-advised determination to foist digital radio switchover on an increasingly resistant public. A critic might even be so bold as to say of new Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport, Jeremy Hunt:

“The Government have ducked sorting out digital radio switchover…. They are giving Ministers the power to switch over in 2015, yes, but without taking any of the difficult measures necessary to make it practical or possible.”

But wait! In fact, these were the words of Jeremy Hunt himself, in April 2010, criticising his predecessor, Ben Bradshaw, during the previous Labour government. Now that the boot is on the Right foot, Hunt seems to have simply dusted off the Labour policy he had previously lambasted, crossed out Bradshaw’s name and written in his own instead.

In his same speech to the House of Commons, Hunt had been scathing about the digital radio switchover clause in the Digital Economy Bill:

“I think that clause is so weak that it is virtually meaningless, as it gives the Secretary of State the power to mandate switchover in 2015 but the Government have not taken the difficult steps that would have made that possible, such as ensuring that the car industry installs digital radios as standard [….] and that there is proper reception on all roads and highways. As a result, a lot of people are very concerned that 110 million analogue radios will have to be junked in 2015.”

That was ‘opposition’ Hunt then. Three months later, ‘government’ Hunt appears to see nothing problematic with the digital radio switchover clause. Indeed, the new government has committed itself to exactly the same fantastical strategy for DAB radio as the old government:

• digital radio listening will somehow reach 50% of the total by 2012
• someone somewhere will pay to upgrade the DAB transmission system to render it as robust as FM
• someone somewhere will launch lots of fab new digital radio stations
• consumers will somehow be persuaded to replace all six or more of their household’s radios with new DAB ones
• analogue radio transmitters will somehow be switched off in 2015
• all cars will somehow be fitted with DAB radios by 2015
• mobile phones and portable devices will somehow all suddenly include DAB, rather than FM, radio receivers.

All these objectives always had been, and still are, pure fantasy. None, and I literally mean ‘none’, of the available evidence and data demonstrate that these things will happen. Definitely not by 2012, certainly not by 2015, and probably never.

A year ago, Hunt was very clear in marking out his party’s strategy for digital radio as more realistic than the ruling Labour government’s:

“I think the most important thing is not something the government can do, but something the industry can do is, which is to develop new services on digital platforms that actually mean there is a real consumer benefit to DAB. At the moment, the benefits are marginal. I mean, there are some benefits in terms of quality, but your batteries get used up a lot more quickly, the reception is a lot more flaky, and a lot of the things that make digital switchover attractive on TV don’t apply to radio in the same way. So I think the industry needs to do a lot more to make it in consumers’ interests to have that switchover…..

We have also got to think about consumer anger. Consumers are people that the radio sector needs. It’s going through a very tough patch. We don’t want to switch off listeners by suddenly saying that we are not going to – that we are going to force you to have a new radio, and there’s a real danger, if we do that, that they might start listening to their iPods and their CD players instead. … At the moment, we seem to be getting into this mindset where we want to force it on the public, even though the public can’t really see what the benefits are.”

So, between then and now, who is it that has convinced Hunt to backtrack and instead to endorse the status quo? The civil servants in his Department who hitched their wagon to the ‘DAB is the future’ train too long ago to let go now? The Ofcom radio staff who were appointed years ago on the strength of their promise to deliver digital radio switchover? The commercial lobbyists who still fantasise about the huge profits to be made (for Britain!) from global exports of their European DAB technology? All of them are nothing more than dreamers.

At the same time, many of these same parties are already distancing themselves from responsibility for DAB so as to save their own skins once DAB’s ‘fall from grace’ inevitably arrives:

• the government is saying that digital radio switchover depends upon the public’s take-up
• the regulator is saying that digital radio switchover depends upon the radio industry’s commitment
• the commercial radio industry is saying that digital radio switchover depends upon the BBC paying
• the BBC is saying that digital radio switchover depends upon its audiences
• the BBC Trust is saying that digital radio switchover depends upon the commercial radio sector’s commitment.

For years now, the stakeholders assembled around the table in those endless DAB committee meetings have been occupied identifying DAB’s problems yet, at the same time, every one of them has expected somebody somewhere else to fix them. But there is no sugar daddy out there. There is no cavalry about to ride over the horizon. It is you stakeholders who created such a mess of DAB and either you must fix it….. or throw in the towel.

This week’s announcement about digital radio switchover demonstrated that the new government does not have the guts to do what many, including the House of Lords Communications Committee chaired by Lord Fowler, had asked of them. To commission an objective analysis of why DAB was introduced in the first place, how close we really are to digital switchover, whether we will ever get there, what the costs have been to the radio sector to date, and to evaluate whether it is still worth pursuing these objectives thirty years after the DAB technology was invented.

Instead, the government has decreed that the present DAB unreality will continue … probably until one of these stakeholders eventually is forced by circumstance to kick the entire digital radio switchover issue into the long grass. In the meantime, the poor consumer is still on the end of misleading campaigns to persuade them that they will need to buy new DAB radios (which are mostly British), throw out their old radios (which are mostly foreign) and somehow get used to the sub-standard quality of DAB radio reception that most of us experience. No wonder they are asking in increasing numbers: ‘What was wrong with FM?’ And the correct answer is: ‘Nothing at all’.

This week’s government statement by Ed Vaizey, the new Culture Minister, was so woolly and vague that the media were able to write it up from wholly contradictory viewpoints.

“Government abandons 2015 target date for switching radio to digital signal,” said the Bloomberg News headline.

“Radio industry welcomes Tory backing for digital switchover in 2015”, said The Guardian headline.

Those two headlines cannot both be true. All the government has done this week is leave everyone more confused than ever. So why did it bother saying anything at all? A critic of Ed Vaizey’s announcement might be moved to say:

“We have got to be concerned that people will be ready before any switchover takes place and that there won’t be literally millions of analogue radios which suddenly become redundant. As you know, the government has set a provisional target date of 2015 and we are sceptical about whether that target can actually be met.”

But wait! In fact, those were the words of Ed Vaizey himself, in March 2010, criticising the then Labour government’s digital switchover plans.

Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.

DAB radio: a national platform that no one wanted

In 1998, the Radio Authority advertised a licence for the “first and only national commercial digital [DAB] multiplex licence.” There was no stampede of applicants. By June 1998, the regulator had to issue a press release with the headline “Radio Authority receives one application ….” The sole applicant was ‘Digital One’, 57% of which was owned by commercial radio’s GWR Group plc, whose chief executive Ralph Bernard later admitted:

“GWR was encouraged to apply for the national [DAB multiplex] licence and was under some pressure to invest in the opportunities for a national licence from the then regulator. Had we not done it, there would be no national DAB platform now. Not only that, [the regulator] did not know what they would have done on the question of national radio stations with regard to the opportunities given by the then government to renew their national licences for a further period of time if they were to commit to going digital. But how can you [do that] if there are no opportunities to go digital because there is no national multiplex? When I put that question to the Radio Authority, I was told that the answer was: ‘We don’t know what would happen – there is no Plan B’. It was just an assumption that someone would go for [the national multiplex].”

Bernard had a hard time convincing his own board that the DAB licence was a worthwhile investment for a radio group that, until then, had owned radio stations rather than transmission infrastructure:

“When we were seduced into believing that this was going to be the only [national DAB] licence, we realised that there would be substantial losses, but the payback would be when you have the opportunity to be the only player in the national market for DAB. When it’s the Radio Authority, an agency of government, you tend to believe what you are told. On that basis, the investment was justified and, at the time, getting it through my Board was not easy. Persuading shareholders, particularly the larger ones, was not easy.”

Now, twelve years later, GWR Group no longer exists, Ralph Bernard is out of the commercial radio business, but the ‘Digital One’ national DAB platform is still there. Nobody really wanted it in 1998, and nobody really seems to want it now. Its ownership has changed hands like pass-the-parcel, GWR Group plc having merged into GCap Media plc, which was then sold to Global Radio which, in 2009, sold its majority stake in Digital One to transmission provider Arqiva. How many millions were thrown at Digital One over the years by GWR, GCap and Global Radio will probably never be known.

The only thing cheap about Digital One was the cost of its initial 12-year licence, a mere £10,000 per annum paid to the regulator for the radio spectrum it uses. The business model was that Digital One would lease space on the DAB platform to radio stations that would pay it rent (about £1m per year, dependent upon audio quality). Since opening for business in 1999, many digital-only stations have tried using the platform but, to date, almost none have stuck around. No digital radio station has yet made a profit.

The latest additions to the lengthening list of stations that have failed to make the national DAB platform work for them are NME Radio and Panjab Radio, both of which quit Digital One in June 2010 (see shaded area of table). The reason? Almost no one was listening. Add together the digital-only stations broadcasting on the platform last quarter (and that are measured by RAJAR) and, in total, they accounted for less than 1% of total radio listening.

Yet the radio industry, the receiver manufacturers and their lobby groups are still spending money on campaigns to convince the public that DAB radio is a raging success. Digital One says its radio platform reaches “more than 90%” of the [UK] population,” equivalent to 46m adults. RAJAR tells us that 35% of those adults have a DAB radio. Yet only 226,000 adults per week listened to NME Radio, after nearly two years on-air. If you were in any way persuaded to believe the hype surrounding DAB, your business plan to start a digital radio station might look dangerously over-optimistic.

When NME Radio launched in June 2008, it had forecast that its audience would reach 396,000 adults per week by its second year. For most of its life, the station was broadcast on local DAB multiplexes (and online). Then, from 21 December 2009, NME Radio was made available nationally on DAB for an eight-month trial. Broadcasting to a much bigger potential audience, there should have been a positive uplift to the station’s performance in Q1 2010. However, there was no noticeable impact upon adult reach (226,000) or hours listened.

In its forecasts, NME Radio had projected that DAB would be “53%” by 2010. Maybe this referred to Ofcom’s forecast that, by year-end 2010, digital platforms (not DAB alone) would account for 50% of all radio listening. In fact, in Q1 2010, only 15% of listening to all radio was via DAB, and 24% was via all digital platforms (worse for commercial radio at 12% and 23% respectively). Ofcom’s forecast of how digital radio usage would grow was disastrously inaccurate. NME Radio did not stand a chance of commercial success using DAB.

The other digital radio station that quit the national DAB platform in June 2010 was Panjab Radio. Like NME Radio, it had broadcast via local DAB multiplexes (and online), but was then made available nationally on DAB for a six-month trial from 1 December 2009.

There was no lift to Panjab Radio’s audience in Q4 2009, but the following quarter saw a noticeable increase to 172,000 adult reach and 913,000 hours listened per week. This was almost twice the amount of listening that NME Radio recorded on the national DAB platform, a real achievement for an ethnic radio station.

The day Panjab Radio had joined the national DAB platform, Digital One operations director Glyn Jones said:

“Like Premier Christian Radio and UCB UK, Panjab Radio relied on a fund-raising appeal to pay for the launch of the station. It’s interesting to see the growth of listener-supported stations, and the way they’re extending the range and choice of stations on air via digital radio. These are stations that neither a traditional commercial model nor the BBC have chosen to provide, but which listeners value so much that they’re prepared to help pay for them out of their own pockets.”

The sub-text was that the Digital One national DAB platform cannot support a commercial digital-only radio station because the financial returns are simply insufficient to cover the expense for it to lease space on the platform. If Panjab Radio had managed to sell advertising at the average commercial radio sector rate, it should have generated £1m per annum of revenue. However, an industry study in 2009 found that the average digital radio station generated only £130,000 revenue per annum (and Panjab Radio attracted less listening than others).

When Panjab Radio quit the national DAB platform in June 2010, Digital One’s Glyn Jones issued a press release that seemed over-eager to deflect the blame:

“Panjab Radio’s revenues come from a mix of traditional radio advertising plus fund raising among Britain’s Panjabi and Sikh communities. Following a strategic and financial review the station opted to end its national transmissions but to continue to broadcast on DAB digital radio in three parts of the country with significant concentrations of the target audience – the West Midlands, West Yorkshire and London.”

As the table above demonstrates, the national DAB platform’s history is littered with commercial digital radio stations that failed to make it work for them. Most of the stations currently on the national DAB platform are non-commercial and so do not need to meet their costs from advertising revenues. But religious stations, army radio and unsigned artists do not come close to the mass market purpose for which the platform was originally envisaged. Did GWR Group make its substantial investment in national DAB in the expectation that, after a decade, the platform would be filled with subsidised radio stations attracting tiny audiences?

Two years ago, I had written:

“This sudden flowering of ethnic, religious and publicly-funded radio stations on the DAB platform echoes the fate of the ‘AM’ waveband in the 1990s … The ‘DAB’ platform of 2008, particularly in London, is already starting to resemble the ‘AM’ platform of 1998, suggesting that ‘DAB’ might have already been written off by the sector as a means to reach the ‘mass market’ audiences that national advertisers desire from the medium.”

Since then, this desperate filling of DAB multiplex capacity with non-commercial stations has spread from London to the national platform. Bizarrely, given the overwhelming empirical evidence that this “first and only national commercial” DAB platform is not working, even after a decade of operation, Ofcom is keen to create a second quasi-national DAB platform. Its rationale is that:

“This could help to facilitate the creation of national commercial radio stations to create a consumer proposition analogous to that of Freeview: a wide range of popular and niche services, delivered digitally” because “we believe DAB still offers the best solution for the future growth of radio in the UK.”

This nonsense was written in an Ofcom report less than a year ago, when the writing on the wall could not have been larger that the national DAB platform’s future for commercial radio was doomed. Surely, a regulator that refuses to deal with the reality of the here and now could be a regulator that will eventually find it has no future. For years, Ofcom (and its predecessor) have led the commercial radio sector a merry dance down a DAB blind alley that has proven almost fatal to the industry’s economic health.

If Ofcom publishes one more policy document proclaiming (as if it were still 1998) that ‘the future of radio’ is DAB, rather than it working to bang industry heads together to find a practical route out of the present mess, all it will succeed in doing is writing its own epitaph.

The cost of upgrading DAB radio: why it will never happen

The current DAB radio transmission system in the UK is presently not robust enough to rival old fashioned, but more reliable, FM. All parties are agreed on that point. To get DAB up to FM standard, a huge amount of work needs to be done, which would cost a lot of money. How much money? Nobody seems to agree upon that point. Sums have been suggested in Parliamentary debates and in reports that vary wildly.

What information is in the public domain about the costs of DAB transmission? In the UK, not a lot. The BBC owns one of the two national DAB radio multiplexes, for which only a small amount of data about costs has been published.

By 2011, the BBC national DAB multiplex will cover 90% of the population at an estimated transmission cost of £11m per annum. The technical challenge of DAB is that you need more additional transmitters than FM (because of DAB’s characteristics) to improve coverage. To achieve 95% population coverage increases the cost of DAB to £38m per annum (the BBC said in 2008). To achieve 99% coverage increases the cost to £40m per annum (the BBC said in 2007).

Compared to the existing FM transmission system (which the BBC said in 2007 offered around 99% population coverage), DAB will be more expensive. Not at present, because DAB is only covering 86% of the population, but increasing that percentage to the same as FM will be costly for DAB. Very costly. By comparison, the existing national FM transmission network had cost the BBC £12m in 2007. This should have reduced to £10m in 2009 after transmission contractor Arqiva agreed to discount its existing contracts (following its acquisition of rival NGW). The same discount may have lowered the cost of existing DAB transmission agreements, but not of future contracts for build-out to 99% coverage.

The BBC broadcasts only four national stations on FM whereas, on DAB, it broadcasts more channels. How many more? The number of BBC stations on DAB varies because one station is part-time and because two full-time stations are proposed for closure next year. To take an example of a music station using 128kbps of DAB bandwidth, it would cost £1.6m per annum to cover 90% of the population, £5.6m to cover 95% and £5.9m to cover 99%. Compare that to a national FM station that currently costs the BBC £2.6m per annum. It seems that DAB may be cheaper at present, but is certainly not cheaper once it is required to achieve equivalent FM coverage.

The second national DAB multiplex in the UK is owned by Arqiva (formerly ‘Digital One’) and covers 90% of the population. Does it publish a price list for commercial customers wanting DAB carriage? Seemingly not. However, in September 2009, Premier Christian Radio had said it was paying £650,000 per annum for national DAB carriage, using 64kbps of spectrum. The pro rata cost for a 128kbps music station would be £1.3m per annum, close to the previously estimated BBC cost for population coverage of 90%. Arqiva says it “is working on a transmitter roll out plan to further extend coverage,” having added four new transmitter sites in 2009.

In Germany, the transmission provider, Media Broadcast, has published a price list for commercial stations interested in broadcasting on its planned DAB platform. It anticipates that German stations will use the more spectrum efficient DAB+ system, whereas the UK is wedded to the older DAB system. The prices quoted below (in Euros) require a radio station to take a minimum 10-year contract and are based on two multiplexes operating at each transmitter location (if that were not to happen, the costs would be higher).

By 2015, Media Broadcast anticipates that its 110 DAB transmitters will provide coverage to 78% of the population indoors and 92% of the population outdoors. There seems to be no commitment in Germany for DAB to achieve the 95% to 99% population coverage that is planned in the UK. Nevertheless, the transmission cost of a (hypothetical) DAB station using 128kbps would be as high as E3.4m (£2.8m) per annum by 2021. As in the UK, the cost escalates rapidly as the DAB network is built out to reach more of the German population. Whereas, in 2011, the initial E0.6m (£0.5m) per annum might not seem prohibitive to cover a country that has a third larger population than the UK, that annual cost is multiplied six-fold by the end of the 10-year contract.

In both the UK and Germany, the cost of DAB roll-out to ensure that reception is as robust as FM will add significantly to the platform’s costs. Without this roll-out, DAB can never replace FM, and the burdensome cost of simulcasting on both DAB and FM will continue. With this roll-out, DAB seems to end up costing more than FM to achieve similar coverage. So what is the point?

In the UK, neither Ofcom nor the government’s DCMS department have published analyses of the costs of DAB roll-out. Their pursuit of the DAB platform has had absolutely nothing to do with the real world economics of the UK radio industry. Their numerous published reports and consultations deal with a virtual reality of the radio industry that exists solely in their minds, perhaps a reflection of the fact that none of them have ever worked in the radio sector they try to regulate.

Ofcom’s plans for upgrading DAB, to be published imminently, merely prolong the regulator’s fantasy that the DAB platform is ‘the future of radio’. Ofcom’s apparent determination to run the radio industry into the ground economically through its insistence upon implementing a misguided ‘digital strategy’ for the sector has already proven a disaster, helping reduce the commercial sector’s profitability to nil. Even more disastrous is the radio industry’s seeming inability to confront Ofcom collectively, to insist that ‘enough is enough’, and to demand that Ofcom goes back to the drawing board in its whole strategy for radio’s future.

How can Ofcom retain an ounce of credibility when it had forecasted publicly (as recently as November 2006) that digital platforms would account for 42% of all radio listening by year-end 2009? The actual figure was 21%. As a result, all those radio operators who had based their business plans for digital radio upon Ofcom’s ‘professional’ forecast have faced financial ruin. Instead of reaching for the tissue box, these businesses should be reaching for their lawyer.

Practical action is what is needed now, not yet another Ofcom fantasy plan for radio’s DAB future.

The DAB radio scrappage scheme – much too little, much too late

The BBC started DAB radio transmissions in the UK twenty years ago and then, ten years later, DAB was implemented commercially. During all that time, DAB radio has failed to ignite the interest of most British consumers. Neither has this European technology been successfully exported to all corners of the globe, as had been anticipated. Countries where DAB is working commercially can be counted on one hand. The end result – warehouses full of unsold DAB radios, billions of pounds of investment unlikely to ever show a return, apathetic consumers and potentially disgruntled venture capitalists.

The one-month DAB ‘scrappage’ scheme announced this week smacks of desperation. In 2009, fewer DAB radio receivers were sold than in 2007. Consumers have voted with their wallets and remain unconvinced. This downward sales trend started before the credit crunch but no action has been taken to stop it. The window of opportunity for DAB radio mass market take-up would seem to have come and gone.

During the first decade of DAB, a scrappage scheme would have been unthinkable. All parties involved in launching DAB were too busy rubbing their hands at the very anticipation of the profits that would be coming their way. High-priced DAB receivers, monopoly control of DAB airwaves and cheap, DJ-free jukebox digital radio stations. You could almost see the pound signs in the eyes of DAB stakeholders.

How times have changed. The DAB radio industry is now a salvage operation. It is a passé technology and the current objective is simply to shift as many of those brick-shaped DAB radios out of storage warehouses as possible, almost at any price. The present period before DAB is finally pronounced DOA is time limited. After that, DAB radios will become the Tamagotchi of the broadcast sector.

The most damning part of all this is the boldness with which the radio industry is still prepared to foist a technology on the public that, in many listening situations, is so technically inadequate. Instead of fixing the problems with DAB reception (which would cost a fortune), the industry just persists in maintaining its stance that DAB radio is fine. But trying to dupe your customers (particularly when radio is the most ‘trusted’ medium, according to Ofcom) must be counterproductive. Crime doesn’t pay if your business model requires loyal listeners.

Just as damning is the industry’s refusal to accept that it is ‘content’ that drives radio listening. Why would anyone buy a relatively expensive DAB radio when it offers so little content over and above what can already be accessed via AM/FM, digital TV, mobile phones and the internet? Commercial radio’s closure of most of its digital stations, followed this year by BBC proposals to axe two of its digital stations, hardly inspire consumer confidence in DAB.

Complicit in this is the radio industry’s willingness to endorse DAB radio set manufacturers’ increasingly desperate measures to shift their products. Pure, the biggest UK brand of DAB radio receivers, is circulating a booklet for consumers to pick up in-store that purportedly “dispels digital radio switchover myths”. Rather than itemise all of the booklet’s assertions that are either untrue (“AM services will either move to FM or to digital only”) or which distort the truth (“Digital radio … crystal-clear, interference-free listening”), I suggest you read it yourself here.

On the one hand, it will make you laugh with incredulity. On the other hand, if you love the radio medium, it will make you cry. Sorry, but when exactly was it that snake oil salesmen took over this industry?

Digital radio station listening: a blip in time saves 6?

The dramatic upswing in BBC 6 Music’s listening during the first quarter of 2010 did not appear to have a knock-on effect on the BBC’s other digital stations [see graph]. 1Xtra was up slightly but still lower than it was in 2009. Asian Network dropped further and is now listened to less than part-time station Five Live Sports Extra.

In the commercial radio sector, Planet Rock recorded its best quarter yet and cemented its lead over all its digital-only competitors (BBC 6 Music excepted) [see graph]. Its continuing success only confirms that consumers prefer real programme content to the digital music jukeboxes whose performances are little more than limping along.

Even with this most recent quarter’s boost from BBC 6 Music and Planet Rock, total listening to digital-only stations has still shown almost no growth for three years [see graph]. Without the coincidence of those two successes, the latest quarter would have proven another disaster.

The question is what the next quarter will look like. We have seen listening to BBC 6 Music rise temporarily before at times when the channel has been in the press. Attracting listeners is only half the job. Keeping listeners is the much harder part.

Does the BBC 6 Music listening blip change the bleak outlook for digital radio stations? Not at all. Why? Because, even after this sudden upswing, 6 Music still attracts only two-thirds of the volume of listening to Radio 3, the BBC’s least listened to analogue national network. 207% of almost nothing still equals very little.

Benefits of DAB radio “insufficient compared to its cost per user” warned EU report … in 2002

Sometimes it proves useful to take a look backwards to try and understand where you are now. In 2002, a 236-page report was produced for the European Commission on the topic of ‘Digital Switchover In Broadcasting’ by BIPE Consulting. Re-reading it is a stark reminder that the current problems with DAB radio implementation in Europe had been anticipated at least eight years ago.

Firstly, the BIPE report admitted that a significant motivation for introducing DAB radio was so that existing licensed European broadcasters could maintain market control in the face of competition from IP-delivered radio content produced by pesky foreigners:

“Some radio broadcasters consider digital radio as a question of survival in the long term … digitisation of content, transmission and multipurpose receivers could squeeze out the possibility of having a dedicated radio platform with its own players, services and listeners. The fact of having a dedicated [DAB] platform could maintain the existing value chain. If not, alternative, third-party digital platform operators will enter the game, and this could reduce radio specificity as it is understood today or even break the radio business model.”

Many of the problems of implementing DAB were identified then:

“New frequencies have to be found to simulcast analogue programmes and new expected ones (which is not the case with digital TV that can be simulcast in the same bands); very high digital receivers prices create a chicken-and-egg situation; while pay TV is a strong driver of TV digital migration, a pay-radio business model seems not to be sustainable so far; RDS, data services and free-to-air multi-channel FM reduce the attractiveness of digital radio.”

And the huge challenge of convincing consumers was made very clear:

“Analogue radio receivers are low cost devices offering numerous, free-to-air channels and with FM audio quality. In this context, the benefits of digital radio as presented by the DAB model so far are insufficient compared to its cost per user.”

The long period of consumer migration from AM to FM broadcasting in Europe was recognised:

“More than 30 years of simulcast AM/FM were necessary to substitute nearly completely AM by FM listening. This lengthy duration covered network deployment, frequency release, launch of music channels (the killer application), and diffusion of FM functionality through the installed base of all the receivers.”

The report identified the “major obstacles to digital radio migration” as:
• Receiver cost
• Low consumer awareness
• No pressure to release the FM band (“DAB is costly in terms of bandwidth used and difficult to insert in existing radio bands. … But the quantity of spectrum released by terminating analogue radio services is much less significant than the potential release of spectrum following the turn-off of analogue terrestrial television broadcasting.”)
• No pay model driver
• No clear killer application (“Together, FM and RDS already combine a certain degree of quality with important data services.”)
• Lack of interest for higher quality sound
• Lack of interest from carmakers
• Necessity of a European market (“Low cost receivers require addressing mass markets. Different national timing in the digitisation of radio does not create the conditions or incentives for achieving critical mass.”)
• The installed base of receivers (“There are between 3 to 5 radio receivers per household, many of them being lower cost receivers. To replace such an installed base means achieving low costs and/or to supply attractive, new services.”)
• Other standards than DAB are possible (“This competition may reduce the mass-market achievement in Europe.”)
• Lack of radio spectrum capacity for DAB (“The DAB multiplex is much larger than one FM channel: insertion in the FM band is not possible, spectrum efficiency is poor.”)
• Multi-channel is already a feature of analogue FM radio (“Additional services will have a marginal effect.”)
• DAB licences have sometimes been delayed.

Finally, the report identified what it called “a chronic chicken-and-egg situation” whereby:
• “Receivers remain expensive because there are no scale effects. This reduces audience and revenues of radio broadcasters who demand that manufacturers decrease receiver prices in order to provoke a mass-market and to trigger mass audiences ;
• There is no specific advantages [sic] in digital radio, no killer application, nobody buys digital receivers, the audience remains negligible, and prices stay high.”

There was even a graphic to illustrate the problem:

 

This all feels very much like DAB in Europe … eight years on. And, to hammer home the impending fragmentation of radio delivery platforms, the report’s recommendations noted that:

“Digital radio will probably be delivered through a much larger variety of technologies and platforms than analogue radio, which is essentially terrestrial. These will involve broadcasting or point-to-point, online or on-air, satellite, terrestrial or cable delivery, DAB, DVB or DRM technologies. These techniques will be competitors but very complementary for consumers and broadcasters.”

The questions all of this raises are:
• How did the UK government’s Digital Radio Working Group spend one year (2007-2008) considering how to make DAB radio a success in the UK but not reference this 2002 report?
• How did the UK government’s Digital Britain consultation spend much of a year (2008-2009) looking for the answers to DAB radio implementation but not reference this 2002 report?
• Did DAB stakeholders in the UK read this report in April 2002? And, if so, did they simply choose to ignore it?

[thanks to Eivind Engberg]

DENMARK: state radio axes DAB radio ‘jukebox’ music channels

Danish state radio, ‘DR’, is cutting the number of DAB channels it broadcasts, many of which are ‘jukebox’ music stations, in order to focus on presenter-led programmes. At the same time, it plans to develop more and better on-demand and mobile content, particularly aimed at young people.

These changes were part of the DR programming strategy for 2011 of ‘quality over quantity’ announced by director general Kenneth Plummer, who said:

“The intention is not to create more, but better and more focused content for the Danish people. This is the recurring theme within our plans for the coming year.”

Announcing the policy changes for DAB radio, DR media director Mikael Kamber said:

“We will get to see more ‘real’ content-focused channels on DAB and fewer pure music channels.”

The DR plan is to re-position its DAB radio channels in order to offer genuine public service content aimed at three specific segments of the audience: children, teenagers and the elderly.

One press report said that the number of DR digital radio channels was to be cut from 29 to 10.

The DR digital radio channels collectively had a weekly reach (via DAB and the internet) of 20.1% in 2009, up from 17.1% in 2008. The DR DAB channels attract a 2.5% share of listening in aggregate, low compared to the DR analogue radio channels P4 (46%), P3 (18.3%), P1 (6.9%) and P2 (4.3%). As in the UK, radio listening in Denmark is in slight decline, down by 4 minutes year-on-year to 2 hours 7 minutes per day in 2009.

DAB radio was launched in Denmark by state radio in October 2002, following trials that started in 1995.

Selling the UK DAB radio ‘success’ story overseas

In amongst all the jubilant public statements from media stakeholders following Assent of the Digital Economy Act 2010 this month, one press release stood out for taking wild optimism to new heights. It said:

“The Digital Economy Bill is linked to the government’s Digital Britain report which defines a digital radio switchover plan lasting two years. The migration start date for this is triggered when DAB coverage reaches the same as today’s FM and when 50% of all radio listening is via a digital platform. Based on current digital listening projections from Rajar, and the roll out of new DAB transmitters from Arqiva and the BBC, the UK market is set to achieve both of these milestone [sic] in 2013 …”

Will 50% of radio listening in the UK be delivered via digital platforms by 2013? Not a chance. Even our politicians have admitted this will not happen. Look at the graph below.

The government’s Digital Britain report, published in mid-2009, had forecast that digital listening would be 26% by year-end 2009, which proved to be wide of the mark. The actual figure was 20.9%. What is the chance of 50% being reached by 2013? Zero.

So why is this press release so determined to tell us that “the UK market is set to achieve” a milestone that is so obviously impossible? The answer lies in this next graph which shows that DAB radio receiver sales in the UK were lower in 2009 than in 2008, and lower in 2008 than in 2007.

The market for DAB radio receivers in the UK has been slowing since the end of 2007. DAB radio unit sales are now less than 2m per annum, a volume last seen in 2006. For financial stakeholders in the UK DAB radio receiver sector, this is very bad news.

Frontier Silicon is one of those main stakeholders, a private UK-based semiconductor company that supplies 70% of the global DAB receiver market. With the UK market for DAB drying up, and the European market never having really developed at all, companies such as Frontier Silicon are having to look further overseas for DAB sales. Trade shows such as last week’s Hong Kong Electronics Fair become significant events to convince new territories of the advantages of DAB radio.

So the Frontier Silicon press release quoted earlier, though datelined “London”, is not intended for domestic consumption at all. Yes, it might seem laughable in the UK to believe that digital listening will reach 50% by 2013. But, for Frontier Silicon, this ‘success’ story will help convince overseas markets that DAB is already a raging success in the company’s homeland. This is ‘sales patter’, not fact.

Who at the Hong Kong event would want to learn that the commercial radio industry in the UK has been brought financially to its knees by its decision more than a decade ago to pursue the DAB dream?

Digital Economy Act 2010: a smokescreen for backroom radio ‘deal’

On 8 April 2010 at 1732, the Digital Economy Act was given Royal Assent by Parliament. Who exactly will benefit from the radio clauses in the Act? Certainly not the consumer.

“The passing of the Digital Economy Bill into law is great news for receiver manufacturers,” said Frontier Silicon CEO Anthony Sethill. As explained by Electronics Weekly: “Much of the world DAB industry revolves around decoder chips and modules from UK companies, in particular Frontier Silicon. These firms can expect a bonanza as consumers replace FM radios with DAB receivers.” Frontier Silicon says it supplies semi-conductors and modules for 70% of the global DAB receiver market.

Sadly, the Bill/Act was not really about digital radio at all. For the radio sector lobbyists, it was all about securing an automatic licence extension for Global Radio’s Classic FM, the most profitable station in commercial radio, so as to avoid its valuable FM slot being auctioned to allcomers. The payback on this valuable asset alone easily justified spending £100,000’s on parliamentary smooching. It was interesting to see one Labour MP acknowledge the true purpose for all this parliamentary lobbying in the House of Commons debate when he congratulated “[Classic FM managing director] Darren Henley for making a cause of the issue.”

The clauses in the Digital Economy Bill on the planned expansion of DAB radio and digital radio switchover were simply promises that Lord Carter had insisted upon as the radio industry’s quid pro quo for government assistance to Global Radio’s most profitable asset. The existence of this ‘deal’ between Lord Carter and Global Radio was confirmed by Digital Radio Working Group chairman Barry Cox in his evidence to the House of Lords:

“Lord Carter did not like to do [the deal] immediately. As I understand, he wanted to get something more back from the radio industry. I think there is a deal in place on renewing these licences, yes.”

However, the quid pro quo promise to develop DAB radio will never come to fruition. Now that Global Radio has got what it wanted, over the coming months, the radio industry’s commitment to continue with DAB will inevitably be rolled back. Every excuse under the sun will be wheeled out – the economy, the expense, the lack of industry profitability (having spent nearly £1bn on DAB to date), consumer resistance, the regulator, the Licence Fee, the government (old and new), the car industry, the French, the mobile phone manufacturers, whatever …….

The reasons that digital radio migration/switchover will never happen are no different now than they were before the Digital Economy Bill was passed into law. For the consumer, who seems increasingly unconvinced about the merits of DAB radio, this legislation changes nothing at all. Those reasons, as itemised in my written submission to the House of Lords in January 2010, are:

• The characteristics of radio make the logistics of switchover a very different proposition to the television medium
• The robustness of the existing analogue FM radio broadcasting system
• Shortcomings of the digital broadcast system, ‘Digital Audio Broadcasting’ [DAB], that is intended to replace analogue radio broadcasting in the UK.

More specifically:

1. Existing FM radio coverage is robust with close to universal coverage
• 50 years’ development and investment has resulted in FM providing robust radio coverage to 98.5% of the UK population

2. No alternative usage is proposed for FM or AM radio spectrum
• Ofcom has proposed no alternate purpose for vacated spectrum
• There is no proposed spectrum auction to benefit the Treasury

3. FM/AM radio already provides substantial consumer choice
• Unlike analogue television, consumers are already offered a wide choice of content on analogue radio
• 14 analogue radio stations are available to the average UK consumer (29 stations in London), according to Ofcom research

4. FM is a cheaper transmission system for small, local radio stations
• FM is a cheaper, more efficient broadcast technology for small, local radio stations than DAB
• A single FM transmitter can serve a coverage area of 10 to 30 miles radius

5. Consumers are very satisfied with their existing choice of radio
• 91% of UK consumers are satisfied with the choice of radio stations in their area, according to Ofcom research
• 69% of UK consumers only listen to one or two different radio stations in an average week, according to Ofcom research

6. Sales of radio receivers are in overall decline in the UK
• Consumer sales of traditional radio receivers are in long-term decline in the UK, according to GfK research
• Consumers are increasingly purchasing integrated media devices (mp3 players, mobile phones, SatNav) that include radio reception

7. ‘FM’ is the global standard for radio in mobile devices
• FM radio is the standard broadcast receiver in the global mobile phone market
• Not one mobile phone is on sale in the UK that incorporates DAB radio

8. The large volume of analogue radio receivers in UK households will not be quickly replaced
• Most households have one analogue television to replace, whereas the average household has more than 5 analogue radios
• The natural replacement cycle for a radio receiver is more than ten years

9. Lack of consumer awareness of DAB radio
• Ofcom said the results of its market research “highlights the continued lack of awareness among consumers of ways of accessing digital radio”

10. Low consumer interest in purchasing DAB radio receivers
• Only 16% of consumers intend to purchase a DAB radio in the next 12 months, according to Ofcom research
• 78% of radio receivers purchased by consumers in the UK (8m units per annum) are analogue (FM/AM) and do not include DAB, according to GfK data

11. Sales volumes of DAB radio receivers are in decline
• UK sales volumes of DAB radios have declined year-on-year in three consecutive quarters in 2008/9, according to GfK data

12. DAB radio offers poorer quality reception than FM radio
• The DAB transmission network was optimised to be received in-car, rather than in-buildings
• Consumer DAB reception remains poor in urban areas, in offices, in houses and in basements, compared to FM

13. No common geographical coverage delivered by DAB multiplexes
• Consumers may receive only some DAB radio stations, because geographical coverage varies by multiplex owner

14. Increased content choice for consumers is largely illusory
• The majority of content available on DAB radio duplicates stations already available on analogue radio

15. Digital radio content is not proving attractive to consumers
• Only 5% of commercial radio listening is to digital-only radio stations, according to RAJAR research
• 74% of commercial radio listening on digital platforms is to existing analogue radio stations, according to RAJAR research

16. Consumer choice of exclusive digital radio content is shrinking
• The majority of national commercial digital radio stations have closed due to lack of listening and low revenues
• After ten years of DAB in the UK, no digital radio station yet generates an operating profit

17. Minimal DAB radio listening out-of-home
• Most DAB radio listening is in-home, and DAB is not impacting the 37% of radio listening out-of-home
• Less than 1% of cars have DAB radios fitted, according to DRWG data

18. DAB radio has limited appeal to young people
• Only 18% of DAB radio receiver owners are under the age of 35, according to DRDB data
• DAB take-up in the youth market is essential to foster usage and loyalty

19. DAB multiplex roll-out timetable has been delayed
• New DAB local multiplexes licensed by Ofcom between 2007 and 2009 have yet to launch
• DAB launch delays undermine consumer confidence

20. Legacy DAB receivers cannot be upgraded
• Almost none of the 10m DAB radio receivers sold in the UK can be upgraded to the newer DAB+ transmission standard
• Neither can UK receivers be used to receive the digital radio systems implemented in other European countries (notably France)

21. DAB/FM combination radio receivers have become the norm
• 95% of DAB radio receivers on sale in the UK also incorporate FM radio
• 9m FM radios are added annually to the UK consumer stock (plus millions of FM radios in mobile devices), compared to 2m DAB radios, according to GfK data

22. DAB carriage costs are too high
• Carriage costs of the DAB platform remain too costly for content owners to offer new, commercially viable radio services, compared to FM
• Unused capacity exits on DAB multiplexes, narrowing consumer choice

23. DAB investment is proving too costly for the radio industry
• The UK radio industry is estimated to have spent more than £700m on DAB transmission costs and content in the last ten years
• The UK commercial radio sector is no longer profitable, partly as a result of having diverted its operating profits to DAB

24. DAB is not a globally implemented standard
• DAB is not the digital radio transmission standard used in the most commercially significant global markets (notably the United States)

These factors make it unlikely that a complete switchover to DAB digital terrestrial transmission will happen for radio in the UK.

With television, there existed consumer dissatisfaction with the limited choice of content available from the four or five available analogue terrestrial channels. This was evidenced by consumer willingness to pay subscriptions for exclusive content delivered by satellite. Consumer choice has been extended greatly by the Freeview digital terrestrial channels, many of which are available free, and the required hardware is low-cost.

Ofcom research demonstrates that there is little dissatisfaction with the choice of radio content available from analogue terrestrial channels, and there is no evidence of consumer willingness to pay for exclusive radio content. Consequently, the radio industry has proven unable to offer content on DAB of sufficient appeal to persuade consumers to purchase relatively high-cost DAB hardware in anywhere near as substantial numbers as they have purchased Freeview digital television boxes.

Additionally, it has taken far too long to bring DAB radio to the consumer market, and its window of opportunity for mass take-up has probably passed. Technological development of DAB was started in 1981, but the system was not demonstrated publicly in the UK until 1993 and not implemented for the consumer market until 1999. In the meantime, the internet has expanded to offer UK consumers a much wider choice of radio content than is available from DAB.

In this sense, DAB radio can be viewed as an ‘interim’ technology (similar to the VHS videocassette) offering consumers a bridge between a low-tech past and a relatively high-tech future. If DAB radio had been rolled out in the early 1990s, it might have gained sufficient momentum by now to replace FM radio in the UK. However, in the consumer’s eyes, the appeal of DAB now represents a very marginal ‘upgrade’ to FM radio. Whereas, the wealth of radio content that is now available online is proving far more exciting.

The strategic mistake of the UK radio industry in deciding to invest heavily in DAB radio was its inherent belief in the mantra ‘build it and they will come.’ Because the radio industry has habitually offered content delivered to the consumer ‘free’ at the point of consumption, it failed to understand that, to motivate consumers sufficiently to purchase relatively expensive DAB radio hardware would necessitate a high-profile, integrated marketing campaign. Worse, the commercial radio sector believed that compelling digital content could be added ‘later’ to DAB radio, once sufficient listeners had bought the hardware, rather than content being the cornerstone of the sector’s digital offerings from the outset.

In my opinion, the likely outcome is that FM radio (supplemented in the UK by AM and Long Wave) will continue to be the dominant radio broadcast technology. For those consumers who seek more specialised content or time-shifted programmes, the internet will offer them what they require, delivered to a growing range of listening opportunities integrated into all sorts of communication devices. In this way, the future will continue to be FM radio for everyday consumer purposes, with personal consumer choice extended significantly by the internet.